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I. Introduction 
One of the critical responsibilities that the Constitution entrusts 
to the President of the United States is the appointment of federal 
judges. The Chief Executive nominates, and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, appoints these officials who enjoy lifetime tenure 
and must resolve disputes implicating the basic freedoms of America's 
citizens. President Clinton's careful discharge of this crucial duty may 
well have yielded the foremost success of his first term in office. 
When then-Governor Clinton campaigned for the presidency in 1992, 
he promised to name intelligent judges who possess balanced judicial 
temperament and evince a commitment to protecting the individual 
rights enumerated in the Constitution. The candidate also pledged to 
increase gender and racial balance on the federal courts.1 The judicial 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner and Hank 
Waters for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing 
this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are 
mine. 
1. See, e.g., Bill Clinton, Judiciary Suffers Racia~ Sexual Lack of Balance, NAT'L L.J., 
Nov. 2, 1992, at 15; Bush v. Clinton: The Candidates on Legal Issues, AB.A. J., Oct. 1992, 
at 57. 
[741] 
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selection record that Clinton compiled during his initial four years as 
Chief Executive shows that he has kept his covenant with the Ameri-
can people by appointing highly qualified federal judges and by creat-
ing a bench that more closely reflects the composition of American 
society. 
Now that President Clinton has secured a second term, judicial 
selection in the Clinton administration warrants evaluation. This Es-
say first analyzes how the Chief Executive chose judges during his first 
term and finds that his administration articulated clear selection goals 
and implemented efficacious procedures for appointing members to 
the federal judiciary. The Essay then offers suggestions for naming 
judges during the second term. If President Clinton institutes effec-
tive measures for choosing judges, federal judicial selection could be 
the area in which his administration leaves its greatest legacy. 
II. Judicial Selection During the First Term 
President Clinton and his staff implemented a systematic, effica-
cious process for appointing judges during his first term.2 Clinton 
carefully articulated his administration's objectives in choosing judges 
and instituted practices to achieve them. For instance, the Chief Exec-
utive proclaimed that competence as. well as increasing gender and 
racial balance on the bench would be important in selecting nomi-
nees. 3 Administration officials worked closely with senators to iden-
tify candidates with stellar qualifications. Some of these senators 
reinstituted merit-based selection commissions which had been effec-
tive in designating talented women and minorities during the earlier 
administration of President Jimmy Carter.4 
The Office of White House Counsel and the Department of Jus-
tice, particularly its Office of Policy Development, shared responsibil-
ity for judicial selection.5 The White House Counsel's Office assumed 
a leadership role in finding potential candidates, especially for vacan-
2. I rely substantially in this paragraph and in this part on Sheldon Goldman, Judicial 
Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276 (1995), and Carl 
Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REv. 309 (1996) [herein-
after Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts]. 
3. See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 315-16. 
4. See ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES Disnucr JUDGE NOMINATING COMMIS-
SIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES (1981); Elaine Martin, Gender 
and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations, 71 JUDICA-
TURE 136, 140 (1987); Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. 
REv. 171, 174 (1990). 
5. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 278. 
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cies on the United States Courts of Appeals.6 The Office of Policy 
Development had major responsibility for reviewing possible nomi-
nees once they had been narrowed to a relatively small number.7 
Both offices relied substantially on the input of senators who repre-
sented the areas in which openings occurred and even deferred to the 
senators' views on many candidates for district court vacancies. This 
practice continued the long tradition of senatorial patronage and cour-
tesy in judicial appointments.8 
The Judicial Selection Group, which the White House Counsel 
chaired and which included White House and Department of Justice 
staff, met weekly to discuss judicial selection.9 In identifying candi-
dates to be considered, the selection group had to balance the goal of 
recommending the most competent attorneys against various political 
realities.10 The White House Counsel typically suggested to President 
Clinton one or more individuals for each opening. The Chief Execu-
tive actively participated in choosing nominees, was consulted during 
several steps, and occasionally tendered candidates or sought other 
names.11 
The Clinton administration apparently made a conscious choice 
to depoliticize the selection process as much as possible. Both the 
President and the officials, who assisted in filling judicial vacancies, 
emphasized competence as well as gender and racial diversity while 
forwarding the names of comparatively few nominees who might 
prove controversial. This reluctance to advance potentially controver-
sial candidates and the corresponding willingness to compromise be-
came more necessary after the Republican Party recaptured control of 
the Senate in 1994. For example, President Clinton decided against 
resubmitting the names of controversial nominees whom he had nomi-
nated in 1994.12 The White House Counsel publicly proclaimed that 
6. See id. at 279. 
7. See id. at 278-79. 
8. See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 317. 
9. This paragraph and much in the remainder of this part are premised on conversa-
tions with individuals who are knowledgeable about the selection procedures that the Clin-
ton Administration employed and on Goldman, supra note 2, at 278-79. 
10. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 279; see also Joan Biskupic, Despite 129 Clinton 
Appointments, GOP Judges Dominate U.S. Bench, WASH. PoST, Oct. 16, 1994, at A20; Neil 
A. Lewis, In Selecting Federal Judges, Clinton Has Not Tried to Reverse Republicans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. l, 1996, at A20. 
11. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 279; U.S. Bench Looks More Like U.S.: Clinton 
Raises Ratio of Women, Minority Judges, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 24, 1994, at A9. 
12. See Joan Biskupic, Facing Fights on Court Nominees, Clinton Yields, WASH. PoST, 
Feb. 13, 1995, at Al; Lewis, supra note 10; Ana Puga, Clinton Judicial Picks May Court the 
Right, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1994, at 1. 
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the administration would not nominate lawyers whose candidacies 
could provoke confirmation battles.13 
The Chief Executive and his assistants informally consulted with 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, which has major responsibility for 
the judicial confirmation process, and also spoke with specific senators 
before formally nominating candidates and seeking Senate confirma-
tion.14 The administration worked very effectively with Senator Jo-
seph Biden (D-Del.) when he chaired the committee during its initial 
half-term. Indeed, President Clinton appointed one hundred judges in 
1994, although he was able to name only twenty-three judges during 
his first year of office due to certain "start-up" difficulties.15 
The administration also maintained a cordial working relation-
ship with Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) when he became the chair of 
the Judiciary Committee in 1995.16 Senator Hatch seemed to handle 
President Clinton's nominees in a manner similar to the way that Sen-
ator Biden treated the Reagan administration's nominees during its 
last two years. Although Senator Hatch's Judiciary Committee did 
approve a substantial percentage of President Clinton's nominees, this 
may have happened because the administration did not submit candi-
dates whom the Republicans would consider politically unacceptable. 
After the 1994 elections, Senator Hatch stated that the Co:nimit-
tee would vote favorably on all nominees who were "qualified, in 
good health, and understand the role of judges."17 In 1995, the Com-
mittee did just that. Senator Hatch held confirmation hearings on one 
appeals court nominee and several district court nominees every 
month.18 During 1995, President Clinton secured the appointment of 
fifty-three judges.19 However, in 1996 the Senate approved fewer 
than twenty-fives nominees as election-year politics and other machi-
13. See Biskupic, supra note 10, at Al. 
14. See supra note 9. 
15. See Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 Hous. L. REv. 137, 
145 (1995) [hereinafter Tobias, Increasing Balance]; Carl Tobias, Dear Judge Mikva, 1994 
Wis. L. REv. 1579, 1581 {hereinafter Tobias, Dear Judge Mikva]. 
16. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra 
note 2, at 317-18. See also Senator Orrin Hatch Looks at Courts, Legislation, and Judicial 
Nominees, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 
1995, at 1 [hereinafter Senator Orrin Hatch]. 
17. See Biskupic, supra note 10. 
18. See Al Kamen, Window Closing on Judicial Openings, WASH. PoST, June 12, 1995, 
at A17. 
19. See Telephone Interview with Deborah Lewis, Legislative Counsel, Alliance for 
Justice (Jan. 22, 1996); see also Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 314. 
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nations, such as the dispute over splitting the Ninth Circuit,20 con-
spired to slow the confirmation process considerably.21 
During President Clinton's initial term in office, he apparently 
kept his promises relating to judicial appointments, and his adminis-
tration achieved the selection goals that it had set. President Clinton 
appointed 202 judges to the federal bench; 62 (31 % ) of whom are wo-
men and 58 (29%) of whom are minorities.22 This judicial selection 
record is unprecedented. It contrasts sharply with the numbers of wo-
men and minorities chosen by the Reagan, Bush, and Carter Adminis-
trations. For instance, President Clinton named more women to the 
bench in his first three years as Chief Executive than President Bush 
appointed in one term and than President Reagan named in eight 
years.23 
The Clinton administration appointees have also received the 
highest rankings for excellence assigned by the American Bar Associ-
ation since that entity began rating nominees' qualifications more than 
forty years ago.24 Virtually all of the judges appear to be highly com-
petent and to have the necessary qualities of independence, integrity, 
intellect, industriousness, and balanced temperament, which are criti-
cal to excellent federal court service.25 For instance, Second Circuit 
Judge Guido Calabresi was the Dean of Yale Law School prior to his 
appointment,26 while Sixth Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore had 
been a highly respected faculty member at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law before her appointment.27 A significant 
number of the appointees had previously served as judicial officers 
either in the federal or state courts. For example, Second Circuit 
Judge Jose Cabranes was widely regarded as a creative, diligent fed-
eral district court judge before being elevated, while Eleventh Circuit 
20. See, e.g., Court Watch: Partisan Game, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at BB. See gener-
ally Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY LJ. 1357 (1995) 
[hereinafter Tobias, Impoverished Idea]. 
21. See Telephone Interview with Mike Lee, Fellow, Alliance for Justice (Sept 3, 
1996); see also Lewis, supra note 10. 
22. See supra notes 15, 19, 21 and accompanying text. 
23. See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 314; see also Goldman, supra 
note 2, at 285. 
24. I rely substantially in the next two paragraphs on Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, 
supra note 2, at 315. See also Lewis, supra note 10. See generally Robert A. Stein, For the 
Benefit of the Nation, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 104. 
25. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 282-83. 
26. See id. at 283. 
27. See CWRU Professor Joins U.S. Court, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, March 30, 
1995, at SB. 
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Judge Rosemary Barkett had earlier been a distinguished member of 
the Florida Supreme Court.28 
Although President Clinton appears to have met his objective of 
appointing highly competent judges during his first term, it is too soon 
to discern precisely what type of judicial service these judges will ulti-
mately render. Certain federal court observers have criticized the ad-
ministration for its failure to appoint politically partisan or liberal 
lawyers to offset the number of conservative judges appointed by 
Presidents Reagan and Bush.29 
Given the substantial obstacles faced by the Clinton administra-
tion, the success attained in realizing its objectives for choosing judges 
is remarkable. During the first year of Clinton's presidency, the judi-
cial selection efforts encountered the same "start-up" problems exper-
ienced by all administrations.30 However, this situation may well have 
been exacerbated because there had not been a Democratic President 
for twelve years and thus the administration had few personnel with 
recent experience in choosing federal judges.31 During President 
Clinton's second year in office, Philip Heymann and Webster Hubbell, 
the first Deputy and Associate Attorneys General, and Bernard Nuss-
baum, the initial White House Counsel, resigned.32 In the administra-
tion's third year, it had to respond to complications created by 
Republican Party control of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives as well as political initiatives, namely the Republican Contract 
With America.33 
During the final year of Clinton's first term, the Chief Executive 
had to address problems involving election-year politics.34 These diffi-
culties were compounded for the first five months by Senator Robert 
Dole (R-Kan.), the majority leader, who was seeking his party's presi-
dential nomination and had responsibility for floor votes on all legisla-
28. See Sheldon Goldman & Matthew D. Sorenson, Clinton's Nontraditional Judges: 
Creating a More Representative Bench, 78 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (1994). 
29. See, e.g., Biskupic, supra note 10; Ted Gest, Disorder in the Courts? Left and Right 
Both Gripe About Clinton's Taste in Judges, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Feb. 12, 1996, at 
40; Lewis, supra note 10;.Puga, supra note 12. 
30. See Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L. REv. 
1861, 1871-72 (1994); Tobias, Dear Judge Mikva, supra note 15, at 1581. 
31. See Tobias, Dear Judge Mikva, supra note 15, at 1581. 
32. See Tobias, Increasing Balance, supra note 15, at 150. 
33. See Republican Contract With America, Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Hottop File. See generally William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Over-
view, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 719 (1995); Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Re-
forms, 48 V AND. L. REv. 699 (1995). 
34. See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 320. 
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tive matters, including confirmation votes on judicial nominees.35 
Senator Dole might have been reluctant to schedule full Senate con-
sideration of candidates who had secured Judiciary Committee ap-
proval lest he seem to lack confidence in his own presidential 
aspirations.36 Finally, during much of President Clinton's first term, 
the Whitewater investigations probably distracted administration em-
ployees, particularly those in the White House Counsel's Office and 
the Justice Department, from choosing nominees.37 
Although President Clinton apparently succeeded in selecting 
highly competent judges and increasing gender and racial balance on 
the bench, his administration was unable to fill all of the existing va-
cancies on the federal courts.38 Indeed, when the Republican-domi-
nated Senate stopped processing nominees during the fall of 1996, 
there were sixteen openings on the appeals courts and forty-two va-
cancies on the district courts.39 
Despite the serious difficulties that President Clinton and his ad-
ministration faced, they attained substantial success in diversifying the 
federal bench. As Clinton begins a second term, his administration 
should attempt to achieve even more by continuing to rely upon most 
of the judicial selection objectives and procedures that it employed in 
the first term and by considering a number of the suggestions which 
follow. 
ID. Suggestions for the Second Term 
A. Introduction 
Recommendations relating to the goals that the Clinton adminis-
tration should pursue and how it can achieve them require relatively 
limited examination here. Numerous similar suggestions have been 
offered elsewhere,40 a few of which have been mentioned above. Be-
cause the Chief Executive and his assistants enunciated objectives and 
instituted procedures which facilitated the appointment of many 
highly qualified judges, recommendations pertaining to this goal and 
its accomplishment warrant minimal review. 
35. See id. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. 
39. See Telephone Interview with Mike Lee, supra note 21. 
40. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 2; Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 
1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1257, 1274-85 [hereinafter Tobias, Rethinking]. 
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All of the problems that could interfere with achievement of the 
administration's objectives cannot be anticipated. For example, it is 
difficult to predict problems that may result from future political 
machinations. illustrative of this point is the Senate's failure in 1996 
to fill a current vacancy on the D.C. Circuit, due in part to the Sen-
ate's determination that the existing contingent of judges was ade-
quate to resolve the court's caseload.41 However, the Clinton 
administration may also have forseen that the legal and political sig-
nificance of an opening on the nation's second most important court42 
could lead to some political development, thereby complicating the 
confirmation of its nominee.43 Numerous difficulties involving judicial 
selection are perennial. For instance, retirements of Supreme Court 
Justices are inevitable, and finding replacements for the Justices may 
consume much of the time of a presidential administration. However, 
the effort that must be devoted to the process can probably be re-
duced by anticipating retirements and by compiling a list of promising 
candidates. The administration should attempt to predict and treat 
problems that are foreseeable while maintaining the requisite :flexibil-
ity to address complications that cannot be anticipated. 
As a first step, the Clinton administration should expeditiously 
enunciate the judicial selection goals that it wishes to achieve during 
the second term and promptly implement measures that will attain 
those objectives. Securing another four years in office has freed the 
administration from concerns about re-election. Accordingly, the 
Clinton administration has the :flexibility to set goals and institute pol-
icies and practices that President Clinton believes are best for the na-
tion and will most improve the courts. 
B. Goals and Reasons for Attaining Them 
Filling all of the present vacancies on the federal bench is one of 
the most significant goals. Only the full complement of Article III 
judges authorized by Congress can expedite litigation by reducing the 
substantial backlogs on civil dockets in many districts, decreasing the 
pressures which the 1994 crime legislation is imposing on the criminal 
41. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Partisan Gridlock Blocks Senate Confirmation of Federal 
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1995, at A16. 
42. See generally Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. 159 (1993). 
43. See sources cited supra notes 20, 21; see also Tobias, Dear Judge Mikva, supra note 
15, at 1579 (indicating that seat has been open since Judge Abner Mikva's 1994 
resignation). 
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justice system, and ameliorating the "crisis of volume" that the ap-
peals courts are experiencing.44 
Another important goal will obviously be the continued appoint-
ment of highly competent, highly qualified lawyers to the federal judi-
ciary. Because of the need to resolve disputes involving fundamental 
liberties and to resolve expeditiously, inexpensively, and fairly the 
ever-expanding federal caseload with fewer resources, appointees 
must be independent, intelligent, industrious, and have balanced 
temperment. 
The above observations regarding caseload increases concomi-
tantly mean that President Clinton should consider working with Con-
gress on the authorization of additional federal judgeships. The 
appointment of more appellate and district judges could be responsive 
to docket growth, although the effectiveness of that approach is con-
troversial.45 For instance, the need to create judgeships may vary 
across appeals courts and from district to district because the size, 
complexity, and growth rates of the caseloads differ. Moreover, the 
courts have employed diverse measures to treat multiplying dockets. 
For example, the Judicial Conference of the United States recently 
requested that Congress authorize ten new judges for the Ninth Cir-
cuit.46 However, a few appellate courts have officially declined to 
seek more judgeships47 and the Senate did not fill an existing opening 
on the D.C. Circuit in 1996, ostensibly finding the present judicial 
complement sufficient.48 Some federal court observers claim that 
other responses, such as making appeals discretionary or restructuring 
circuits, might have greater efficacy at the appellate level49 and that 
44. For discussion of district court backlogs, see Tobias, Dear Judge Mikva, supra note 
15, at 1580; and Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 310. See also FEDERAL 
CoURTS STUDY CoMMITIEE, JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF 
THE FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY CoMMITTEE 109 (1990) (discussing crisis of volume). See 
generally Record-Setting Workloads Confront Federal Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH (Ad-
min. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), July 1996, at 2. 
45. See Senator Orrin Hatch, supra note 16, at 10; see also Senate Holds Hearing on 
A/location of Judgeships, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., 
D.C.), Nov. 1995, at 7. 
46. See Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 20, at 1411; Carl Tobias, The New Certi-
orari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 1264, 1271 (1996). 
47. See Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 20, at 1362; Interview with Judge Jane 
R. Roth, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Wilmington, DE (Apr. 1, 1996). 
48. See Lewis supra note 41. A rather similar situation obtains in the federal districts, 
some of which have not experienced docket growth. 
49. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, 1000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Judiciary, 16 
JUDICATURE 187 (1993); Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 
1993, at 70; see also Martha Dragich, Once a Century: Tune for a Structural Overhaul of the 
Federal Courts, 1996 W1s. L. REv. 11. But see Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too 
750 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:741 
additional mechanisms, such as limiting jurisdiction or enhancing al-
ternatives to dispute resolution, could prove more effective in the dis-
trict courts.so Many federal judges also strongly oppose the bench's 
expansion and have voiced concerns that this would reduce collegial-
ity or the quality of decisionmaking.s1 Moreover, judgeship bills are 
controversial and politicized because they afford a sitting President 
the opportunity to appoint numerous new judges and expand the 
Chief Executive's political influence. Therefore, Congress will scruti-
nize and may ultimately reject proposals for authorizing more judges. 
Nonetheless, this prospect would afford enough benefit to deserve se-
rious consideration. 
Additionally, the Clinton Administration should continue its ef-
fort to increase gender and racial balance on the federal courts. Nam-
ing greater numbers of female and minority attorneys could enhance 
their judicial colleagues' understanding of complex policy issuess2 as 
well as reduce gender and racial bias in the federal civil and criminal 
justice systems.s3 Such appointments may inspire greater public confi-
dence in the courts by forming them to more closely resemble the 
population at large.s4 It is also important to rectify the lack of gender 
and racial balance on the current federal bench, most of whose mem-
bers are Reagan and Bush appointees.ss For instance, less than two 
percent of the Reagan administration's appointees were African 
American, and President Bush placed only one Asian American on 
the federal courts, despite the fact that both of these Republican Pres-
Many Cases: A Plea to Save the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52; William L. 
Reynolds & William M. Richman, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem 
for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 273 (1996). 
50. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1994) (instituting experimental compulsory arbitra-
tion); Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Justice by 
Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 Tux. L. REv. 1485, 1499 (1995) (book review). 
51. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 49; Tjoflat, supra note 49. 
52. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?, 
62 JUDICATURE 488, 494 (1979); Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising it 
Higher?, Affirmative Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 
YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 270, 272 (1983); Marion Z. Goldberg, Carter-Appointed Judges -
Perspectives on Gender, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 108. 
53. See FEDERAL CoURTS STUDY CoMMrITEE, supra note 44, at 169; Lynn Hecht 
Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus For Judicial Reform, 21 ARIZ. ST. 
LJ. 237, 238, 271-73 (1989). See generally THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE NINTH CIR-
CUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE July (1992). 
54. See Slotnick, supra note 52, at 272-73; Tobias, Rethinking, supra note 40, at 1276. 
55. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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idents had substantially larger, more experienced pools of female and 
minority attorneys to draw upon than did President Carter.56 
Increasing political balance on the federal bench is another im-
portant goal. For example, several observers have urged President 
Clinton to select judges who can offset the perspectives of numerous 
Reagan and Bush appointees, particularly those of certain high-profile 
jurists, such as Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas and Seventh Circuit Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard 
Posner, some of whom the Chief Executives named for the express 
purpose of making the bench more conservative.57 Because the two 
Republican Presidents so explicitly enunciated this goal, President 
Clinton could justifiably pursue the opposite objective, although he 
would be vulnerable to criticism like that leveled against his predeces-
sors. Continued appointment of highly qualified female and minority 
attorneys could partly respond to concerns regarding political balance. 
For instance, considerable evidence suggests that numerous women 
and minorities might strike a different political balance in resolving 
certain substantive matters; this assertion, however, remains some-
what controversial.58 
In the final analysis, whether attempting to secure greater bal-
ance is an objective which the administration should pursue partly de-
pends on its perspectives on the roles and responsibilities of federal 
judges and on the courts' purposes in a constitutional democracy. For 
example, a number of federal courts scholars believe that the Consti-
tution's general phrasing and the difficulty of drafting clear legislation 
requires judges to expound that the law and those declarations are at 
least informed by policy or political factors.59 However, quite a few 
observers, particularly politicians, disavow this view.60 Should Presi-
dent Clinton conclude that attaining more political balance is worth-
56. See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 322; see also Goldman, supra 
note 2, at 285, 288. 
57. See Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary, 68 JUDICATURE 313, 324-25 
(1985); see also sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
58. See Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative 
Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 
168-73 (1983); Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive la Difference?, 73 JUDI-
CATURE 204, 208 (1990); Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the 
Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Court of Appeals, 56 J.L. & PoL'Y 425 (1994). 
59. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 3 (1976); Dragich, 
supra note 49, at 15. See generally WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTER-
PRETATION (1994). 
60. See, e.g., Gest, supra note 29; Bob Dole, Judicial Appointments Can Shape Nation's 
Course, Hous. CHRoN., Dec. 26, 1995, at A27; Joyce Price, Clinton Bench Appointments on 
Hold: "Liberal Activism" Worries Senators, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at A4. 
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while, the administration may find that it must compromise other 
important goals, such as filling the bench, to accomplish the objective. 
C. Suggestions for Achieving Goals 
President Clinton should begin planning for judicial selection im-
mediately. The Chief Executive and his staff initially may want to re-
consider the goals that they pursued during the last four years, 
especially in light of the suggestions above. One important immediate 
purpose was to assemble a package of nominees for submission to the 
105th Congress when it convened in January 1997. An efficient way in 
which the administration accomplished this objective was by resubmit-
ting the names of candidates whose nominations languished but who 
were acceptable to relevant constituencies.61 Once President Clinton 
has attained his short-term goals, the administration should consider 
the following recommendations for achieving the objectives examined 
in the above subsection over the remainder of the four years. 
The best way to fill all current openings on the federal bench is by 
building on the valuable procedures that President Clinton and his 
aides employed during the first term.62 For instance, the administra-
tion must continue to work closely with the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee and its chair and with senators who represent states from which 
nominees are drawn.63 The Chief Executive and his assistants should 
also encourage maximum participation by individuals and interest 
groups, such as the American Bar Association, state and local bar as-
sociations, women's groups and minority political organizations. 
One efficient technique might be the elevation to appeals courts 
of district court judges who rendered distinguished service. Because 
these judges have already secured confirmation, the Senate would 
readily approve most of them, and there would be no need for time-
consuming background investigations and security clearances. Presi-
dents Reagan and Bush used this approach effectively and the Clinton 
administration has employed it selectively;64 however, President Clin-
ton may want to consider increased reliance, especially if efficiency 
becomes a factor. 
61. See Clinton Nominates 22 to the Federal Bench, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 7, 1997. 
62. See supra Part I. 
63. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 14-18. 
64. See Mark Ballard, U.S. Judicial Hopefuls Have Long Wait, TEXAS LAWYER, June 
24, 1991, at 1-2; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 10, 1990, at Al; Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 7, 313-14. 
But cf. Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 20, at 1402 (suggesting that circuit and dis-
trict judges have different qualifications). 
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The Clinton administration should also consider how much it 
would be willing to compromise the realization of other goals in order 
to eliminate existing vacancies, although, this might prove unneces-
sary if the process established works efficaciously. For example, were 
President Clinton to pursue less gender, racial or political balance on 
the courts, he could probably fill the bench more easily.65 
When deciding whether to seek an increase in the number of fed-
eral judges authorized, the Chief Executive ought to work closely with 
members of Congress and with the Judicial Conference because the 
policymaking arm of the federal courts has substantial expertise in this 
area. Most Conference recommendations for additional judgeships 
are carefully considered, comparatively conservative, and premised on 
relatively objective factors, such as complexity and size of caseload 
per judge in circuits and districts.66 Nevertheless, a number of observ-
ers perceive the federal judiciary as self-interested or at least overly 
protective of its prerogatives. A few senators and representatives 
have increasingly scrutinized the Third Branch's budget requests and 
related facets of federal court operations.67 In any event, because 
judgeship proposals are always controversial and politicized, Congress 
will closely analyze, and may reject, suggestions for authorizing more 
judges.68 
Recommendations for how President Clinton can name addi-
tional highly qualified female and minority attorneys to the courts de-
serve comparatively brief analysis here. Some suggestions have been 
offered elsewhere69 and several appear above. The Clinton adminis-
tration is clearly committed to appointing more women and minorities 
and has implemented efficacious procedures for attaining this objec-
tive;70 however, the Chief Executive and his assistants might examine 
new ways of redoubling efforts to seek, designate, and name addi-
65. I am not suggesting that President Clinton should do so. See Carl Tobias, Judicial 
Appointments: Cautious Approach Advised, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 9, 1996, at A18; see also To-
bias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 326. 
66. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 49, at 300-03. 
67. See, e.g., Appellate Survey Results Released, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office 
of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), June 1996, at 1; Bill to Prioritize Buildings Passes, id. at 5. 
See generally William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, re-
printed in 18 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 499 (1995); Lauren K. Robel, Impermeable Federalism, 
Pragmatic Silence, and the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 71 IND. L.J. 841, 844 
(1996). 
68. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 1240, 1245-49 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap]; Tobias, Rethink-
ing, supra note 40, at 1274-85. See generally Goldman, supra note 2. 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
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tional capable female and minority judges. The President and admin-
istration personnel should expand their successful endeavors to 
appoint women and minorities by considering new approaches and re-
lying upon previously untapped resources.71 
The selection of Supreme Court Justices and appeals court judges 
warrants cursory evaluation because the White House has assumed 
substantial control over nominees to those courts.72 President Clinton 
and the White House Counsel must insure that White House employ-
ees who help choose judges appreciate the significance of increased 
representation of female and minority lawyers and work to perfect 
processes for accomplishing this goal. During the Clinton administra-
tion's first term, these personnel clearly understood the objective and 
used quite effective procedures to achieve it.73 
The goals and practices for appointing district court judges de-
serve scrutiny because the Chief Executive has deferred to senators 
from the areas where the judges will serve.74 Numerous senators insti-
tuted, or continued relying upon, measures to identify and foster the 
candidacies of competent female and minority practitioners.75 The 
President should laud those senators who have helped achieve his ju-
dicial selection goals while encouraging other senators to undertake 
similar efforts. 
President Clinton might reiterate in an appropriate public forum 
his strong commitment to naming even larger numbers of female and 
minority attorneys. The Chief Executive could write specifically to 
senators, requesting their assistance in proposing more women and 
minorities and in implementing procedures, namely nominating com-
missions, which will search for these lawyers and promote their 
appointment. 
Senators and administration employees who have responsibility 
for judicial selection should enlist the aid of additional sources in 
seeking the names of female and minority practitioners. Administra-
tion personnel and members of the Senate must rely on conventional 
entities, such as bar associations, which can offer some assistance. 
Equally significant would be some less traditional sources, including 
women's organizations and minority political groups. President Clin-
ton must also work closely with all of the female senators, who can 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
72. See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 316-17; see also Goldman, 
supra note 2, at 279. 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
74. See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 317. 
75. See id. at 319. 
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persuade their colleagues to recommend more women and minorities 
and help the President encourage their candidacies.76 Qualifications 
and contacts of female and minority attorneys, who now constitute 
approximately one-quarter of practicing lawyers in the United States, 
will be important.77 The efforts and networking capabilities of women 
and minorities in the administration, such as Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Eleanor Dean Acheson, and of Roberta Ramo, who recently 
completed her term as the first female President of the American Bar 
Association, may be quite helpful.78 
If President Clinton decides to pursue the goal of increasing polit-
ical balance on the federal courts, one starting point would be ex-
panding the number of female and minority appointees. While some 
of those judges will enhance political balance,79 certain sources which 
might help find women and minorities may also be able to recommend 
attorneys who would increase political balance. 
Many other candidates who could enhance political balance can 
be easily identified. One promising source is the faculty of United 
States law schools. Numerous professors have the requisite intelli-
gence, independence, and industriousness to be fine federal judges. 
For example, President Reagan drew several high-profile, conserva-
tive appointees, including Justice Scalia and Circuit Judges Posner and 
Easterbrook, from legal academia.80 Additional sources can be desig-
nated with similar felicity, such as lawyers for certain public interest 
litigation groups, such as the NAACP, Public Citizen Litigation 
Group, the Sierra Club, and the ACLU. Finally, many attorneys in 
the plaintiffs' personal injury or criminal defense bars as well as in 
federal and state government are also potential candidates. 
IV. Conclusion 
President Clinton had an enviable record of judicial selection in 
his first term of office. The Clinton administration carefully identified 
its objectives for choosing judges and implemented efficacious proce-
dures for realizing those goals. The President named unprecedented 
numbers and percentages of extremely able judges, many of whom 
were female and minority practitioners, and substantially decreased 
76. See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts, supra note 2, at 324. 
77. See id. 
78. See Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap, supra note 69, at 1248-49. 
79. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
80. See Goldman, supra note 57. But cf. Lewis, supra note 10 (suggesting that Presi-
dent Clinton has appointed few judges from academia). 
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existing federal court vacancies. If the Chief Executive and his assist-
ants continue to follow these objectives and processes and implement 
suggestions made in this Essay, they will be able to appoint numerous 
highly competent female and minority judges and fill all of the open-
ings during the next four years. 
